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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff-Appellant Brian and Christie, Inc. dba Taco Time (hereinafter "Taco Time") 
filed this lawsuit against Defendant-Respondent Leishman Electric, Inc. (hereinafter "Leishman 
Electric") to recover damages arising kom a fire at its Rexburg location on June 9,2004. This 
lawsuit was filed after Taco Time settled for 50% of its damages with Sign Pro, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Sign Pro") in another lawsuit. This lawsuit against Leishman Electric was dismissed when the 
trial court granted summary judgment holding that Taco Time's negligence claims were barred 
by the economic loss rule. It is from this order dismissing the case against Leishman Electric that 
Taco Time appeals. 
The Course of the Proceedings Below 
In early 2006 Taco Time sued Sign Pro, Leishman Electric and others in a different 
lawsuit. R. Vol. I, p. 63 Almost immediately after filing this lawsuit Taco Time and its 
attorneys "decided at that point to focus our attention on Sign Pro of Southeast Idaho, Inc., and 
discontinue our pursuit of the other defendants at that time." R. Vol. I, p. 60 An Amended 
Complaint was filed by Taco Time naming only Sign Pro as the party defendant. R. Vol. I, p. 65 
The strategy resulted in recovery of "50% of the total damages and prejudgment interest." R. 
Val. I, p. 60 
On October 2,2006, Taco Time filed this lawsuit naming Leishman Electric as the party 
defendant and sought to recover the remaining 50% of its alleged damages. R. Vol. I, pp. 9 and 
14 at 77 30 and 3 1 After some initial discovery Leishman Electric moved for summary 
judgment on June 5,2007, contending that the statute of limitations, res judicata and/or collateral 
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estoppel and the economic loss rule barred Taco Time's Complaint against Leishman Electric. 
The trial court denied the motion in part and granted it in part. The trial court held that the 
economic loss rule applied but did not completely bar Taco Time's claims. R. Vol. I, p. 98 
After additional discovery, Taco Time moved for summary judgment on April 10,2008, 
contending that there were no genuine issues of material fact about the negligence of Leishman 
Electric or the damages to which Taco Time was entitled. On that basis Taco Time sought 
judgment as a matter of law for damages in the amount of $146,868.04 and pre-judgment interest 
of $70,496.66 for a total of $217,364.70. R. Vol. I, pp.104 and 141 The trial court denied Taco 
Time's motion: 
Plaintiffs move the Court to grant summary judgment on their negligence 
action against Leishman Electric. Their motion is premature. Two elements of 
their case, causation and damages, have issues of material fact fit for jury 
determination. As to causation, several individuals worked on the sign and there 
is an issue of fact as to the extent each individual's actions had in the fire's 
causation. As to damages, the court has ruled that the Plaintiffs are limited to 
non-economic damages; there is an issue of fact as to the amount of those 
damages. Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is denied. 
R. Vol. 11, p. 283 
Taco Time moved for reconsideration "on the grounds and for the reason that Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit that the Court's "economic loss" ruling and application is erroneous as a 
matter of law given the undisputed facts established by the record in this case." R. Vol. 11, p. 285 
With its Motion for Reconsideration, Taco Time also filed a Motion to Amend its Complaint. 
The primary amendment it sought was to correct what its lawyers called a "mistake." The 
"mistake" was that after two years of litigation against Leishman Electric, Taco Time's lawyers 
had decided that Taco Time was not limited to recovering 50% of the damages it claimed to have 
suffered, but could instead recover Leishman Electric's proportionate share of the total damages 
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proved by Taco Time at trial. R. Vol. 11, pp. 289 and 296 at 77 30 and 31 
On October 1,2008, the trial court reconsidered its prior decisions, concluded that its 
prior ruling on economic loss "was erroneous because Plaintiffs damage claims do not survive 
application of the economic loss rule" and dismissed Plaintiffs complaint against Leishman 
Electric. R. Vol. 11, pp. 302 - 304 The Motion to Amend was also denied "as it is also based 
strictly on allegations of Defendant's negligence." R. Vol. 11, p. 304 
Statement of Facts 
At the outset, a point of clarification is in order. Taco Time asserts that the facts it quotes 
in its "Statement of Material Facts" at page 6 of its Opening Brief are all "either undisputed 
andlor supported by the evidence viewed most favorably to Taco Time as the non-moving party 
opposing summary judgment." Throughout its Opening Brief, but particularly at pp. 1 - 2,9 - 11 
and 13 - 19, Taco Time quotes evidence allegedly supporting its claim of negligence against 
Leishman Electric which is, and was, only germane to Taco Time's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Leishman. The Court's denial of Taco Time's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Vol. 11, p. 283) is not at issue here. No appeal was taken from that decision. R. Vol. 11, pp. 343 
a t 1 1  and353atTl 
The Negligence Case Against Leishman Electric is Disputed 
Regarding evidence which allegedly supports Taco Time's claim of negligence against 
Leishman Electric, Taco Time is not entitled to have the evidence construed most favorably to it 
because Taco Time was the moving party on the Motion for Summary Judgment in which it tried 
to obtain summary judgment against Leishman Electric on negligence and causation. Although 
Leishman Electric does not believe these factual issues are important to determining the 
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"economic loss" question, because Taw Time devoted the time and effort to establish negligence 
on the part of Leishman Electric, a brief rebuttal is in order. 
At the heart of the allegations of negligence against Leishman Electric are the 
transformers which were part of the used neon signage which Brian Larsen purchased from a 
closed Taco Time restaurant in Nebraska. R. Vol. I, p. 77 at 7 8 A photograph of one of the 
transformers is appended to this Brief. (Exhibit "G" to Cooper Second Affidavit attached to 
Motion to Augment.) A transformer takes electricity of one voltage and changes it into another 
voltage. In the case of the neon transformers which Brian Larsen supplied and Sign Pro 
installed, it required two connections on each transformer to operate the neon sign, one on the 
primary side a~ld one on the secondary side. Leishman Electric attached the building power to 
the primary side of the transformers. R. Vol. I, p. 88 at deposition transcript p. 14, LL 1 - 4 
However, to operate the neon signs the transformers also had to be connected to the neon signs. 
Michael Packer, the untrained employee of the unlicensed sign contractor which Brian Larsen 
hired', made that connection. R. Vol. 11, p. 263 at 7 11 Taco Time repeatedly states that Sign Pro 
did not make the "final" coimection, or that Sign Pro did not "energize" the circuit and that 
Leishman Electric "connected" the power to the neon sign. (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 1,9, 
10, 13, 16 and 19) Because it took two connections to energize each neon sign, it can just as 
easily be said that Sign Pro made the "final" connection, "energized" the circuit and "connected" 
the power to the neon sign. The trial court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed 
'Brian Larsen made absolutely no effort to determine Sign Pro's qualifications to do the 
repairs to the damaged signs and the installation at the Taco Time facility in Rexburg. R. Vol. I, 
p. 56, Answer to Interrogatory No. 19 
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which required a jury to apportion negligence and causation between the several actors. R. Vol. 
11, p. 283 
It is undisputed that the transformers did not have secondary ground fault protection, a 
fact which was known to Michael Packer, the untrained employee of the unlicensed sign 
contractor which Brian Larsen hired. R. Vol. II, p. 263 at f/ 10 Plaintiff's experts opine that the 
fire was caused by a short circuit at a location where one of the neon tubes had broken. R. Vol. 11, 
p. 255 Beginning in 1996, the National Electric Code required that transformers used with neon 
signs have secondary ground fault protection which would interrupt the power in the event of a 
short circuit. R. Vol. 11, p. 229 The remodel which included the installation of the transformer 
and signage took place in 1998/1999. Taco Time's claim against Leishman Electric is that if 
Leishman Electric had discovered the transformers supplied by Brian Larsen and installed by 
Sign Pro were non-compliant with the National Electric Code it could have prevented the fire 
which occurred five years later by not making its connection to the transfonner which supplied 
power to the neon sign which short circuited. The same can be said of Sign Pro. 
In opposition to Taco Time's Motion for Summary Judgment, Paul Moore, an electrical 
engineer, submitted the following testimony by affidavit. (Affidavit of Paul Moore attached to 
Leishman Electric's Motion to Augment) Although the 1996 NEC required that neon sign 
transfonners have secondary ground fault protection, by reason of a delay in approving and 
adopting labeling regulations, it was not until after this installation in early 1999 that neon 
transformers were required to have a label affixed to the transformer showing that it was 
equipped with secondary ground fault protection. Therefore, in early 1999 Leishman Electric 
would have had to dismantle the transformer to determine whether it was equipped with 
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secondary ground fault protection. The transformers which were supplied by Brian Larsen and 
installed by Sign Pro contained labels identifying them for "Luminous Tube" use. The 
transformers also contained a UL sticker which identified them as a "gas tube transformer." 
"Luminous Tube" and "gas tube" are common terms used to identify "neon lights." The 1996 
NEC required that "Transformers and electronic power supplies shall be identified for the use 
and shall be listed." (1 996 NEC 600-23) This transformer was in compliance with those 
requirements when Leishman Electric connected power to the primary side of the transformer. 
Paul Moore opined that under the circumstances of this case Leishman Electric was not required 
to inspect either the transformer or the neon signs for compliance with the National Electric 
Code. (See Affidavit of Paul Moore attached to Leishman Electric's Motion to Augment Record) 
The trial court held that "several individuals worked on the sign and there is an issue of fact as to 
the extent each individual's actions had in the fire's causation." R. Vol. 11, p. 283 
The Critical Evidence Necessary to Decide the Application of the Economic Loss Rule is 
Undisputed 
1. When Brian Larsen, one of the owners of Taco Time, decided in 1998 to remodel his 
Taco Time in Rexburg, he contracted with an out of state general contractor to do the 
remodel. R.Vol. I, p. 77, at 7 7 
2. The general contractor subcontracted with Leishman Electric to do the electrical work. R. 
Vol. I, p. 50, at Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 All of the electrical work performed by 
Leishman Electric at the Taco Time in Rexburg was performed under its subcontract with 
the general contractor and not under any contractual relationship with Taco Time. R. 
Vol. I, p. 50, at Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 
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3. The neon signs which were purchased by Taco Time and repaired and installed by Sign 
Pro were part of the remodel project. R. Vol. I, p. 77, at 7 8; R. Vol. I, p. 10, at 77 7, 8 ,9  
and 10; R. Vol. 11, pp. 277 - 78 at 77 7,8,9 and 10; R. Vol. 11, p. 292, at 77 7,8,9 and 10 
4. The only causes of action alleged by Taw Time against Leishman Electric in this case are 
based in negligence. R. Vol. I, p. 9; R. Vol. I, p. 50, at Answer to Interrogatory No. 10; 
R. Vol. 11, p. 276; R. Vol. 11, p. 291 
5. The damages which Taco Time seeks were, except for a minimal deductible, paid by 
Taco Time's fire insurance company. All of the property which was damaged in the fire 
was part of the Taw Time restaurant. It included the building, fixtures, contents and 
equipment. Taco Time also sought lost profits while the restaurant was closed for repairs. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 78 - 79, at f l 14  - 18; R. Vol. I, pp. 109- 141 Taco Time sought recovery 
of the following items of damages: 
Cost of repairs or replacement of the building 
Cost of replacement of restaurant equipment 
Cost of cleaning contents 
Replacement of credit card equipment 
Lost business profits 
Replace water softener 
Replace HVAC unit 
Replace business communications equipment 
Replacement of floor tile 
Inventory/personal property replacement 
Furnace replacement 
Replace microwave and fieezer 
Clean cash registers 
These undisputed facts support the trial court's decision to dismiss Taco Time's claims 
because they are barred by the economic loss rule. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. If the trial court is reversed and this matter remanded for further proceedings, should 
Taco Time be permitted to include a claim for pre-judgment interest in its Amended 
Complaint? 
2. If the trial court is reversed and this matter remanded for fiuther proceedings, should the 
economic loss doctrine prevent Taco Time's tort recovery for damage to the subject of the 
transaction, even if damage to "other property" is identified? 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BARS TACO TIME'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
The United States Supreme Court, exercising its admiralty jurisdiction, and most, if not 
every state, in the United States have adopted some form of the economic loss rule either by 
judicial decision or by statute. See the cases collected in the appendix to William K. Jones, 
Product Deficts Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendency of Corztuact oveu Tout, 44 U. Miami 
L. Rev. 73 1, 799 (1990). There are as many versions of the rule as there are jurisdictions which 
have applied the rule to a particular set of facts2. 
L 
For example, Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 2005) observed 
that because the "economic loss" doctrine permits tort recovery only for personal injury or 
damage to "other property," if property is damaged it is necessary to identify the product at issue 
which defines "other" property. The subject of "other property" has been approached in a number 
of different ways. Much of the law addressing the issue of what constitutes "other property" deals 
with whether the other property is a distinct item or merely a component of the overall defective 
product. Other courts have focused on whether "goods" are involved. Yet others have concluded - 
&at the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery for injury to "other property" if the injury was, 
or should have been, reasonably contemplated by the parties to the contract. Some have 
concluded that the "product" is-the product purchasedby the plaintiff, not the product sold by the 
defendant. 
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This Court recognized in Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircrafr Co., 97 
Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306 (Idaho 1975) that the "economic loss" rule in Idaho has its genesis 
in the debate about how far courts were willing to extend tort liability, specifically products 
liability, in cases arising out of contractual relationships. In Dean v. Barvett Homes, Inc., 968 
A.2d 192, 406 N.J. Super. 453,472 (App.Div. 2009) the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate 
Division, discussed the interplay between tort law and contract law: 
The economic loss rule "defmes the boundary between the overlapping 
theories of tort law and contract law by barring the recovery of purely economic 
loss in tort, particularly in strict liability and negligence cases." R. Joseph Barton, 
Note, Dvowning in a Sea of'contvact: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to 
Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1789, 
1789 (2000). The purpose of the rule is to "strike an equitable balance between 
countervailing public policies," that exist in tort and contracts law. Geimady A. 
Gorel, Note, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Arguing for the Intermediate Rule and 
Taming the Tovt-eating Monster, 37 Rutgers L. J. 517,524 (2006). 
This theoretical basis for the economic loss rule, however, provides little guidance about 
how to apply the rule to a particular set of circumstances. In Idaho the economic loss rule is 
described as: 
Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of 
purely economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent 
economic loss to another. Dufin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n., 126 Idaho 
1002,1007,895 P.2d 1195,1200 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. Cofin, 113 Idaho 37, 
41,740 P.2d 1022, 1026 (1987); Clark v. International Hawester Co., 99 Idaho 
326,336,581 P.2d 784, 794 (1978). The rule "applies to negligence cases ifl 
general; its application is not restricted to products liability cases." Ramerth v. 
Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848,851 (1999) (citations omitted). 
"Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property 
which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate 
value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 
Inc., v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351, 544 P.2d 306,309 (1975). On the 
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other hand, "property damage encompasses damage to property other than that 
which is the subject of the transaction." Id. 
Blahd v. RichavdB. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,300, 108 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2005) 
Distinguishing between the "subject of the transaction" and "other property" is a 
perplexing task. The economic loss rule does not seem to be conducive to bright line rules which 
makes its application to a particular set of circumstances difficult. That is no less the case here. 
Taco Time was in privity of contract with the person or entity Erom whom it purchased the 
damaged neon sign and the transformers which did not comply with the National Electrical Code. 
Taco Time did not exercise its contractual remedies against the seller for the defects which it 
now alleges caused the fire that caused the damages it seeks to recover. Taco Time was in privity 
of contract with the general contractor which subcontracted with Leishman Electric for the 
electrical work on the remodel project in 199811999. Taco Time did not exercise its contractual 
remedies against the general contractor. Taco Tiine was in privity of contract with Sign Pro 
which installed the neon signs and connected it to the transformers. Taco Time did exercise its 
contractual remedies against Sign Pro and elected to settle for 50% of its loss. 
Because of Taco Time's decisions to either not exercise or only partially exercise its 
contractual rights against those with which it had privity of contract and, instead, seek recovery 
against an entity with which it did not have privity, the trial court was and now this Court is 
faced with deciding whether Taco Time should be able to recover the rest of its damages from 
Leishman Electric based only on negligence theories. In Texas, this lack of privity would 
preclude Taco Time's claims under its interpretation and application of the economic loss rule. 
Sterling Chems., Inc. v. Texaco Inc., 259 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2007) 
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(Texas courts have applied the economic loss rule to preclude tort claims between parties who 
are not in contractual privity) 
Citing the "modem trend3" the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Dalcota Gasijkation 
Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1099 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996), held that the economic loss 
rule precluded the owners of an oxygen plant from recovering against the subcontractor who 
supplied the pre-engineered metal building that enclosed the oxygen plant4. Similar to this case, 
the building did not fail until more than eight years after the subcontractor had finished its work. 
That is when a part of the oxygen plant's roof collapsed under the weight of ice and snow, 
causing damage to various items within the plant. Although the collapse caused significant 
damage to property, it did not cause any personal injuries. The collapse was caused by a faulty 
weld which was not, but allegedly should have been, discovered during the construction. The 
trial court and the appellate court were faced with trying to determine whether the damage was 
only to the product itself [the '"poduct itself' and "the subject of the transaction" are similar, if 
not the same concept] or to "other property." Both decided there was no damage to "other 
property" and barred recovery based on the economic loss rule: 
The trial court recognized that the modem trend in many jurisdictions 
holds that tort remedies are unavailable for property damage experienced by the 
3 
The "modem trend" has been described as the "forseeability test" which involves the 
extension of the economic loss doctrine to preclude liability in tort for physical damage to other 
nearby property of commercial purchasers who could foresee such risks at the time of purchase. 
Dakota GasiJication Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1101 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996) 
4 
It should be noted that although the modern trend is still binding in Eight Circuit federal 
litigation, North Dakota has not yet adopted this "modem trend." See Albers v. Deere & Co., 
599 F. Supp. 2d 1142,1147 (D.N.D. 2008) 
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owner where the damage was a foreseeable result of a defect at the time the 
parties contractually determined their respective exposure to risk, regardless 
whether the damage was to the "goods" themselves or to "other property." 
Dakota Gasi$catioiz Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1099 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996) 
. . . it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the natural consequence 
of an installed structural component's failure would be daiage only to the 
stmctural component itself without any damage to the surrounding property. If 
such economic damage is a foreseeable consequence to the parties in a 
commercial relationship governed by the UCC, then it is a proper subject for 
negotiation and contract law, not for tort remedies. The modem trend's reasoning 
is therefore nothing more than a fairly subtle and very logical extension of the 
economic loss doctrie discussed in East River and adopted in Coopevative 
Power. Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit noted, many cases discussing the "other 
property" exception end up holding that the damage was only to the property 
itself. 
Dakota Gas8cation Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996) 
Allowing tort remedies in a case such as this would perversely encourage 
contractors to "bargain" for no warranty or insurance protection in exchange for a 
reduced purchase price, because they could rely on tort remedies as their 
"warranty." Such an outcome is plainly inconsistent with the values of commercial 
efficiency and predictability that drive the economic loss doctrine . . , 
Dakota GasiJication Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. N.D. 1996) 
The facts of this case are not unlike the facts in Dakota Gasification. There the roof 
collapsed causing damages to various items in the plant. Here the Ere caused damages to various 
items in the Taco Time restaurant. Taco Time has or had contract remedies against those with 
which it had contractual relationships. Clearly it could have bargained for warranties and other 
contractual protection from those with which it had contractual relationships. Taco Time insured 
itself &om the risk of these damages as evidenced by the fact that this is an insurance subrogation 
action. R., Vol. I, p. 54, Answer to Interrogatory No. 16 If the "modern trend" were applied to 
this case, the "economic loss doctrine" would bar any tort claims for the damages which Taco 
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Time now seeks to recover from Leishman Electric. 
In 1998, the American Law Institute adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability, 5 21 which addressed the issue but failed to provide any bright line rule to make 
application of the economic loss rule easier. The following comment provides what little 
guidance is offered: 
Harm to the plaintiff's property other than the defective product itself. A 
defective product that causes harm to property other than the defective product 
itself is governed by the rules of this Restatement. What constitutes harm to other 
property rather than harm to the product itself may be difficult to detennine. A 
product that nondangerously fails to function due to a product defect has clearly 
caused harm only to itself. A product that fails to function and causes harm to 
surrounding property has clearly caused harm to other property. However, when a 
component part of a machine or a system destroys the rest of the machine or 
system, the characterization process becomes more difficult. When the product or 
system is deemed to be an integrated whole, courts treat such damages as harm to 
the product itself. When so characterized, the damage is excluded from the 
coverage of this Restatement. A contrary holding would require a finding of 
property damage in virtually every case in which a product harms itself and would 
prevent contractual rules fi-om serving their legitimate function in governing 
commercial transactions. 
The "integrated whole" referred to in Section 21, Restatement (Third) Torts is also 
referred to as an "integrated system analysis." Many courts use this analysis to help determine if 
the case involves damage to the product itself (i.e. the subject of the transaction) or damage to 
other property. Based on the language in Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,301, 
108 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2005) Idaho appears to favor this analysis to help identify whether the 
I damage alleged is to "other property": 
The fact that the buyer in Tusch Enterprises only sued the builder and the seller is 
immaterial. It is the subject of the transaction that determines whether a loss is 
property damage or economic loss, not the status of the party being sued. The 
Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole. Like the leveled lot 
and duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the subject of the transaction in this case is both 
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the lot and the house. That being the case, the damages to the Blahds' house are 
purely economic' and the Blahds' negligence claims against the Smith Entities and 
Jones are barred by the economic loss rule. (Emphasis supplied) 
The trial court followed this guidance and concluded in this case that: "the various 
components of the remodeling, including electrical rewiring . . . were of necessity integrated 
with the existing building to better facilitate the purpose for which the building was used, a 
restaurant." Therefore, the trial court concluded that the subject of the transaction was the 
restaurantibuilding and because "Plaintiffs damage claims do not relate to any property 'other 
than that which is the subject of the transactio11"' the clai~ns are barred by the economic loss rule. 
R. Vol. II, p. 304 
Other courts, most notably Wisconsin, have more fully developed the "integrated whole" 
analysis which has been identified as the "majority view"': 
. . . the homeowners purchased a finished product, their condominium units, 
the quality of which fell below expectations. While the Association argues that the 
defective windows caused damage to interior and exterior walls and casements, 
these are but other component parts in a finished product. Because of the integral 
relationship between the windows, the casements and the surrounding walls, the 
windows are simply a part of a single system or structure, having no function 
apart kom the buildings for which they were manufactured. 
Bay Breeze Condo. Ass'n v. Norco Windows, 2002 WI App 205,651 N.W.2d 738 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2002) 
Regardless whether property is other property in a literal sense, it may be 
"other property" in a legal sense for purposes of the economic loss doctrine. See 
5 
Dean v, Barvett Homes, inc., 406 N.J. Super. 453,470, 968 A.2d 192 (App.Div. 2009) 
concluded that in the case of construction defects, the integrated system analysis is the majority 
view: "We conclude that the sounder view is expressed by us most recently in Marrone and the -
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the critical issue. Here, plaintiffs purchased a house, 
not exterior siding, and the exterior siding was an integrated component of the finished product 
of that house. 
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Grams v. Milk Prods., inc., 2005 WI 112, PP27, 3 1,283 Wis. 2d 51 1, 699 
N.W.2d 167. At least two tests are used to determine whether damaged property is 
"other property" in a legal sense: the "integrated system" test and the 
"disappointed expectations" test. Id., PP27-28,3 1. We discuss both below and 
then, in subsequent subsections, apply them. 
Foremost Farms USA Coop. v. Performance Process, Znc., 2006 WI App 246,297 Wis. 2d 724, 
726 N.W.2d 289 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) 
What is immediately apparent from reading the Foremost Farms case is that in many 
situations the "integrated system" test and the "disappointed expectations" test can be difficult 
and complicated to apply. Thus, not even this approach results in an easy fix to the complicated 
analysis necessary to determine if the economic loss rule applies. However, the "integrated 
system" test which looks to see whether the allegedly defective product is a component in a 
larger system, appears to answer the questions presented by this case. The electrical subcontract 
work of Leishman Electric which involved re-wiring the electrical system in the Taco Time 
building so that it could function as a restaurant, including running power to components like the 
transformers for the neon signs, was completely integrated into a larger system, that being the 
remodeled restaurant building. Under these circumstances the restaurantibuilding was an 
integrated system. The electrical wiring had no function apart ij-om the restaurant where it was 
installed. According to the Foremost Farms decision, "If damaged property is not "other 
property" under the "integrated system" test, the economic loss doctrine applies and tort claims 
are barred. The "other property" inquiry ends." 
So it is in this case. The Memorandum Decision denying Taco Time's Motion for 
Reconsideration and granting summary judgment to Leishman Electric stated: 
It is the restaurantibuilding, not the services provided via remodeling, that was the 
subject of the transaction; and it was the building, its contents, and the profits 
derived from the building's use that were damaged by the fire. Plaintiffs damage 
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claims do not relate to any property "other that which is the subject of the 
transaction." 
R. Vol. 11, p. 304 
The trial courf was correct in dismissing Taco Tirne's claims because they are barred by 
the economic loss rule. 
B. A CALAMITOUS EVENT IS NOT A RECOGNIZED EXCEPTION TO THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN IDAHO AND IS NOT A GOOD TEST FOR 
DETERMINING WHEN THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE APPLIES 
Taco Time contends that the economic loss rule does not apply "where an accident, 
casualty event, disaster, or other calanitous event" occurs. Appellant's Opening BrieE; p. 2 1 
This argument is raised for the first time on appeal and should not be considered. Rainerth v. 
Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848 (Idaho 1999) (exceptions to the econoinic loss rule 
which were not asserted nor decided by the district court will not be considered for the first time 
on appeal) R. Vol. 11, pp. 285-287 
In the event this Court does consider the application of this exception, Taco Tinle's 
argument should be rejected for several reasons. The United States Supreme Court rejected this 
exception as a basis for determining whether the economic loss rule applies in E. River S.S. Coup. 
v. Trnnsamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858,870,90 L.Ed. 2d 865, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (US. 1986): 
. . . Nor do we find persuasive a distinction that rests on the manner in 
which the product is injured. We realize that the damage may be qualitative, 
occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage. Or it may be 
calamitous. Compare Movrow v. New Moon Homes, Irzc., 548 P. 2d 279 (Alaska 
1976), with Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P. 2d 248,251 (Alaska 1977). But either 
way, since by definition no person or other property is damaged, the resulting loss 
is purely economic. Even when the hann to the product itself occurs through an 
abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, 
and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of 
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its bargain -- traditionally the core concern of contract law. See E. Farnsworth, 
Contracts 3 12.8, pp. 839-840 (1982) 
The "destructive or calamitous exception" appears to be a minority view. See discussion 
in E. Rivei,S.S. Covp. v. Transarnevica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, at 869 - 870 (US. 1986) 
Kentucky rehsed to adopt this exception as a valid method for determining when to apply the 
economic loss rule: 
. . . we hold that the destructive or calainitous exception to the E.conomic 
Loss Rule does not apply in Kentucky. As the Supreme Court of the United States 
noted in East River S.S. Corp. and as the Graves Circuit Court noted herein, there 
is no logical reason to determine the amount of damages available based on 
whether a product failed by small increments or suddenly. The end result is the 
same, the product failed. 
Indus. Risk Insurers v. Giddings &Lewis, Inc., 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. July 2, 
2009) 
One of the decisions relied upon by Taco Time to support its argument that the 
"destructive or calamitous" exception is good policy has been rejected by a later decision. 
Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236,243 (6th Cir. Mich. 1994) (Our decision today 
explicitly rejects the approach taken by the district court in Citizens Ins. Co. v. Proctor & 
Schwartz, 802 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Mich. 1992), affd on other grounds, 15 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 
1994)) The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also strongly suggested that the distinction 
between "disaster and mere commercial disappointment" is not the "bright line rule" which Taco 
Time suggests it is. Detroit Edison Co. v. NRBCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236,242 (6th Cir. Mich. 1994): 
We recognize that the extent of the damage--both to property and persons- 
-suggests a hazardous product and, therefore, implicates concerns addressed by 
tort law. [citations omitted] However, the approach adopted by Neibarger focuses 
our inquiry not so much on the magnitude or extent of the damage as on the 
parties involved and the nature of the product's use. 
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Other courts have predicted that if the issue were presented to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
it would not adopt the "destructive or calamitous" exception to the economic loss rule: 
. . . the United States Supreme Court has rejected an attempt to distinguish 
cases based on the manner in which the product is damaged. E. River S.S. COT?. v. 
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858,872, 106 S. Ct. 2295,90 L. Ed. 2d 865 
(1986). Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, 
accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value and lost 
profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its 
bargain -- traditionally the core concern of contract law. Id. at 870. A federal court 
in Idaho also has predicted that Idaho courts would refuse to recognize a "sudden 
and calamitous event" exception to the economic loss rule. See Memorandum 
And Order filed March 3, 1999 in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Harnischfegev Corp., D. 
Idaho No. 97-0490-E-BLW, at 8, attached to Reply In Support Of Cessna Aircraft 
Company 's Motion For Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs Spirit Air, Inc. 
And Mountain Bird, Inc. (Doc. # 602) filed October 15,2008. This Court likewise 
predicts that the Idaho Supreme Court would decline to create an accident 
exception to the ecoiiomic loss rule. 
In re Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.  Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (D. Kan. 2008) 
Judge Winmill's decision in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., D. Idaho No. 97- 
0490-E-BLW is appended to this Brief. Concluding that the "sudden and calamitous event" 
exception is the minority rule, Judge Winmill predicted that the Idaho Supreme Court would 
refuse to adopt it. 
It is unclear @om Appellant's Opening Brief whether Taco Time believes the Idaho 
appellate courts have already adopted the "destructive or calamitous exception" or whether Taco 
Time is advocating its adoption. To date, the Idaho Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized 
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the "destructive or calamitous exception." Idaho currently recognizes two (or three) exceptions6 
to the economic loss rule: 
The general rule in Idaho is that there is no recovery for pure economic 
loss in a negligence action, as there is no "duty" to prevent economic loss to 
another. Duf$n v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 
P.2d 1195, 1200 (1995). The two exceptions to this general rule are where a 
special relationship exists and the occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a 
different allocation of risk. 
Nelson v. Anderson Lumbev Co., 140 Idaho 702,710,99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) 
Although the "special relationship" exception has been applied to the facts of one case, 
the "unique circumstances" exception has never been applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in any 
of the cases presented to it.. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,299, 108 P.3d 996 
(Idaho 2005) Taco Time does argue that this case presents a situation where the "unique 
circumstances" exception should apply, but Taco Time does argue that the "special relationship" 
exception applies. That argument will be addressed later in this Brief. 
Although fairly siinple to explain, the economic loss rule is difficult to apply. A fact 
which Judge Moss candidly admitted when he stated "I've struggled with this, gentlemen, for at 
least five or six years on this miserable rule and when I think I've got it figured out there's a new 
wrinkle in it and I'm not sure it's as easy as you're presenting." Tr., p. 20, LL 17 - 21 Another 
exception will only make the economic loss rule more unclear and difficult to apply. Idaho 
'Judge Winmill inJ.R. Simplot Co. v. Harnischfeger COT., D. Idaho No. 97-0490-E- 
BLW stated that Idaho recognizes three exceptions. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Nelson v. 
Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702,710,99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) states that Idaho 
recognizes two exceptions while in Graefe v. Vaughn, 132 Idaho 349,350,972 P.2d 317 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1999) it identified three exceptions. 
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should not adopt the "destructive or calamitous exception" which several courts, including the 
United States Supreme Court, have found to be illogical. The ''desbxctive or calamitous 
exception" does not further the policies behind the "economic loss" rule and will not make the 
rule easier to understand or easier to apply. 
C. IN THIS CASE THERE IS NO PROPERTY OTHER THAN THAT WHICH IS 
THE SUBJECT OF THE TRANSACTION SO THE 'PARASITIC EXCEPTION' 
DOES NOT APPLY TO SAVE TACO TIME'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS 
Taco Time faults the trial court for not giving it the benefit of the "parasitic exception" to 
the economic loss rule. This Taco Time claims "evidences its [the trial court's] lack of 
understanding of the scope or proper applications ofthe economic loss rule." Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 28 The trial court understood that its task was to identify the "subject of the 
transaction" so that it could determine if there was any "other property" to which Taco Time's 
economic loss could be parasitic. It is not surprising that the trial court found the "instaIlation of 
the signs" was integrated into the building because, from the beginning, Taco Time claimed that 
the neon signs were purchased by it aid repaired and installed by Sign Pro as part of the remodel 
project. R. Vol. I, p. 77, at 7 8; R. Vol. I, p. 10, at 7,8,9 and 10; R. Vol. 11, pp. 277 - 78 at fl 
7,8,9 and 10; R. Vol. 11, p. 292, at 77 7,8,9 and 10 Those admissions support the trial COW'S 
conclusion that it was the remodeled restauranthuilding which was the subject of the transaction, 
not the neon sign and transformer installation contract as argued by Taco Time. To save its 
negligence claims against Leishman Electric the economic losses must be parasitic to "other 
damage" and not to the subject of the transaction. DuBn v. Idaho C ~ o p  Improvement Ass'n, 126 
Idaho 1002, 1007,895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho 1995) ("property loss" encompasses "damage to 
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property other than that which is the subject of the transaction.") 
The use of the phrase "economic losses which are parasitic to an injury to person or 
property" began in Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462,469,583 P.2d 997 (Idaho 1978) 
(cases where the plaintiff seeks recovery for purely economic losses without alleging any 
attending personal injury or property damage must be distinguished from cases involving the 
recovery of economic losses which are parasitic to an injury to person or property). 
Dufjn v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002,1007,895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho 
1995) more fully developed the phrase " parasitic to an injury to person or property." The Idaho 
Supreme Court explained: 
Following Just's, this Court has adhered to a general rule prohibiting the 
recovery of purely economic losses in all negligence actions. See, e.g., Tusch 
Enters. v. CofJin, 1 13 Idaho 37,41,740 P.2d 1022,1026 (1987) (defending the 
rule that "purely economic losses are not recoverable in negligence"). Based solely 
on the application of this general rule, the district court's analysis regarding the 
recovery of economic loss in tort would be correct; ordinarily a party would owe 
no duty to exercise due care to prevent the type of loss suffered by the Duffins. 
However, there are exceptions to the general rule of non-recovery. 
First, economic loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to 
person or property. E.g., Just's at 468,583 P.2d at 1003. We have defined 
"economic loss" as including "costs of repair and replacement of defective 
property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for 
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman 
Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306,309 (1975) 
(citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds. Conversely, "property loss" 
encompasses "damage to property other than that which is the subject of the 
transaction." Id. See also Tusch Enterprises v. Cofjn, 113 Idaho 37,41,740 P.2d 
1022, 1026 (1987); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336, 699 P.2d 
1349, 1350 (1985); ClarkInternational Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,332,581 
P.2d 784,790 (1978). Since the losses claimed here are purely economic, this 
exception is inapplicable. 
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See also Graefe v. Vaughn, 132 Idaho 349,350,972 P.2d 317 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) 
(Although the general rule is that such losses are not recoverable, the Dufin Court went on to 
state that in certain instances, a party can recover for purely economic loss in tort when: (1) it is 
parasitic to an injury to person or property; (2) the occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a 
different allocation of the risk; or (3) where a "special relationship" exists between the parties) 
Taco Time appears to recognize that, in cases of property damage, before the economic 
loss is considered "parasitic to an injury to property))) the damage must be to "other property" 
ineaning property other than that which is subject to the transaction. This is clearly the rule in 
Idaho. In Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 301, 108 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2005) the 
Idaho Supreme Court made clear that it "is the subject of the transaction that determines whether 
a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of the party being sued." The trial 
court in this case held that the subject of the transaction was the extensive remodel project in 
199811999 which made the entire restaurant and building an integrated whole for purposes of 
applying the econoinic loss rule. R., Vol. II, p. 304 
The Idaho Supreme Court has decided cases which are conceptually similar to this case 
and those decisions help determine the subject of the transaction for purposes of applying the 
economic loss rule in this case. In Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848 (Idaho 
1999) Ramerth attempted to avoid the application of the economic loss rule by arguing that it 
was Hart's service which was the subject of the transaction and not the engine or the airplane that 
was serviced. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that it was the airplane, 
not the mechanical services, which was the subject of the transaction. Similarly, in Dufin v. 
Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002,895 P.2d 1195 (1995) the Idaho Supreme Court 
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held that it was the seed, not the inspection, which was the subject of the transaction. In Tusch 
Enterprises v. Co@n, 113 Idaho 37,740 P.2d 1022 (1987) the Idaho Supreme Court held that it 
was the duplex itself, not the construction, which was the subject of the transaction. 
Following the reasoning of those cases, the trial court was correct in concluding that the 
subject of the transaction in this case was the remodeling of the restauranthuilding, not the neon 
sign and transformer installation contract. The decision in C & S Hamilton Hay, LLC v. CNN 
Am. LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 13 151, 10-1 1 (D. Idaho Feb. 21,2008) does not dictate a 
different result. Judge Lodge distinguished the decision in Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,197, 
983 P.2d 848 (Idaho 1999): 
. . . The factual circumstances in Ramerth presented a different issue to 
decide than the one faced by the Court in this case. The court in Ramevth was 
required to determine whether or not there was a difference between service 
performed on the engine and the engine itself that would create a distinction as to 
what constituted the "subject of the transaction." In this case no service has been 
performed and therefore the Court is not asked to make such a distinction. A 
relationship between sewice and the physical item receiving the service would 
support the "integrated whole" idea from Blahd However, in tlus case the Court 
fails to see how an itemlservice relationship relates to two separate physical items 
and the Court is not convinced that Ramevth warrants a finding that the 
implements in this case constitute the "subject of the transaction." Therefore a 
finding that the impiements constitute "economic loss" wouid be improper. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
C & S Hamilton Hay, LLCv. CNHAm. LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13151, 10-11 (D. Idaho 
Feb. 21,2008) 
That distinction described by Judge Lodge makes the C&S Hamilton Hay decision 
inapplicable to the facts of this case. Leishman Electric supplied material and services to 
perform the electrical subcontract on the Taco Time restaurant in 199811999, just like the 
mechanic did when he performed his overhaul and service of the airplane engine in Rumerth. It 
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is the electrical services which Taco Time claims caused the fire in this case, just as it was the 
claim of Ramerth that Hart's mechanic services caused the damage to the engine and airframe of 
the airplane when Hart left out the four spacers in the course of the overhaul. Judge Lodge was 
correct when he observed that if there was a "relationship between service and the physical item 
receiving the service" it would support the "integrated whole" idea from Blahd. There are no 
"peripherals" in this case because, like the trial court concluded, the business was an integrated 
whole and all of the damage was to the "subject of the transaction" and is considered economic 
loss. "Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the 
subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of 
profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Air. Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 
P.2d 306,309 (1975) 
There must be damage to other property, i.e. property which was the "subject of the 
transaction" to establish "property damage" which can eliminate the application of the econoinic 
loss ntle based on the theory of "parasitic loss." There is no "other property damage" in this case 
and therefore the theory of (or exception for) "parasitic loss" is not applicable. 
D. THE BUILDING REMODEL WAS THE TRANSACTION AND THE SUBJECT 
OF THE TRANSACTION WAS THE RESTAURANTBUILDING 
Taco Time urges this Court to separate the remodeling transaction from the transaction 
for the installation of the transformers and neon sign. It is undisputed that there was no 
contractual relationship between Taco Time and Leishman Electric. Leishrnan Electric 
performed all of its work as part of its subcontract with the general contractor who had the 
contract for the remodel of the restaurantbuilding. R. Vol. I, p. 50, at Answer to Interrogatory 
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No. 10 Taco Time's argument that the subject of the transaction for determining the liability of 
Leishman Electric is a transaction with which Leishman E!ectric admittedly had no involvement 
makes no sense. It makes even less sense when judged against Taco Time's repeated admissions 
that the purchase and installation of the neon signs were part of the remodel project. 
In the original decision granting Leishman Electric's economic loss motion for summary 
judgment in part and denying it in part, the trial court concluded "the subject of the transaction 
with which Leishman Electric was involved was the remodel project" and decided "that the 
economic loss rule bars any negligence claims asserted against Leishman Electric, except for 
property damage not involved with the remodel project." R. Vol. I, p. 102 The trial court did not 
identify what it thought was damage to "other property" except to note in a footnote that "some 
of the damage claims appear to be separate from the remodel project." R. Vol. I, p. 102 at fn 6 
In Taco Time's Motion for Reconsideration, it did not identify the "other property." The 
Motion for Reconsideration claimed: 
The fire damage to the building and equipment clearly establishes "other property 
damage." The Court's prior Memorandum Decision acknowledges "other 
property damage." By definition, where there is "other property damage," the 
"economic loss rule does not apply under the governing Idaho case law." 
R. Vol. 11, p. 286 
In further support of its argument that there was "other property damage" Taco Time 
submitted the Second Affidavit of Brian Larsen which laboriously attempted to separate 
"economic losses" from "non-economic losses." R. Vol. I, pp. 109 - 141 Although the 
restaurant was expanded during the 199811999 remodel, "95% of all electrical wiring was new 
in the remodel." R. Vol. I, p. 11 1 at 7 6 The electrical wiring, of course, was part of Leishman 
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Electric's subcontract. The trial court concluded as folIows afier considering the submission by 
Taco Time: 
Brian Larsen's second affidavit of April, 2008, illustrates the difficulty of 
attempting to parse the buildingtrestaurant into portions that were actually being 
remodeled and portions that were not. This affidavit reveals that the building and 
remodeling are an "integrated whole", and that it was the buildinglrestaurant as an 
integrated whole that was the "subject of the transaction." 
R. Vol. 11, p. 302 at fn 1 
On appeal Taco Time relies on the same affidavit the trial court considered. Appellant's 
Opening Brief, pp. 11 - 13 However, having failed to convince the trial court that it could 
identify the damage claims which were "separate from the remodel project" Taco Time has 
changed tactics on appeal. Taco Time now argues that the "only defective property involved in 
this case is the neon sign and transformers." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34 Taco Time further 
argues that the "transaction" was the "agreement between Taco Time and Sign Pro to install the 
neon sign and transformer." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 34 Its theory to avoid application of 
the economic loss rule is illustrated by this statement: 
Rather, the correct economic loss analysis identifies the only neon sign and 
transformer as the defective property. Such property was the "subject o P  the 
"transaction" between Sign Pro and Taco Time. Such property was not the 
"subject of'  any "transaction between Taco Time and the general contractor." 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 37 
Based on this analysis, Taco Time argues on appeal that the fire resulted in damage to the 
"defective neon sign and transformer" and everything else was "other property" including "the 
building, fixtures, equipment, appliances, inventory, other personal property and contents located 
therein." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 28 
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This analysis ignores that the basis for Taco Time's claim against Leishman Electric is 
that Leishman Electric allegedly breached its duty as the electrical contractor by connecting "the 
primary building power supply to the defective neon sign and obsolete transformer without 
bothering to inspect or determine whether it was safe to do so." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 19 
There must be a nexus between the "transaction" and the "reach of duty." In every Idaho case 
involving the economic loss rule there was a nexus between the transaction and the breach of 
duty. Blahdv. RichavdB. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,300, 108 P.3d 996(Idaho 2005) reviewed 
the prior "econoinic loss" decisions and clarified what "transaction" meant: "These cases indicate 
the word "transaction," for purposes of the economic loss rule, does not mean a business deal--it 
means the subject of the lawsuit." It would not he the "subject of the lawsuit" without a nexus. 
The "transaction" for purposes of this case is not a business deal between Taco Time and 
Sign Pro to install transformers and a neon sign. The trial court correctly concluded that "the 
damage claims arise from restaurant property damaged by the fire." R. Vol. II, p. 304 Leishman 
Electric's only nexus was as a subcontractor to the general contractor who was hired to remodel 
the Taco Time building to make it a better restaurant, not to make a building which was later 
converted into a restaurant. Leishman Electric did not just wire the transformer to which Sign 
Pro connected the neon signs. Leishman Electric rewired 95% of the entire restaurant building. 
In Blahd the homeowner ''purchased the house and lot as an integrated whole." Here Taco Time 
purchased a remodeled restaurant and the "various components of the remodeling, including 
electrical rewiring, installation of the signs, and other huilding improvements were wholly 
integrated into the building, not separate and apart from it." R. Vol. II, p. 304 It was the building 
and the restaurant which were the subject of the transaction. 
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The trial court's conclusion that the subject of the transaction was the restauranthuilding 
is supported by the numerous cases involving defective component parts. A good example is Pro 
Con, Inc. v. J&B Drywall, Inc., 20 Mass. L. Rep. 466 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006) 
In claims involving defective component parts, most courts have held that 
the relevant "product" is the finished product into which the component is 
integrated. See, e.g., East River, 476 U.S. at 867-68 (stating in admiralty law that 
"since all but the very simplest of machines have component parts, [a contrary] 
holding would require a finding of 'property damage' in vitally every case where a 
product damages itself. . . and would eliminate the distinction between warranty 
and strict products liability.") 
This is entirely consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's use of the "integrated whole" 
concept in Blahd where it held that the house and lot must be considered an integrated whole and 
any damage to the house or the lot is considered purely economic loss. Some courts have 
described the task of determining the subject of the transaction as one of looking for the identity 
of the product purchased by the plaintiff, as opposed to the product sold by the defendant. It 
would make no sense for the court to look for a transaction which even Taco Time admits did not 
involve Leishnan Electric to find the subject of the transaction. The only "product" which Taco 
Time purchased and which involved Leishman Electric was a remodeled restaurant. Because the 
finished product was the result of work by many contractors, it is completely logical to consider 
the remodeled restauranthuilding an "integrated whole." It integrated all the work performed 
by the various contractors who completed the project. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in Shipco 2295, Inc. v, Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925,927 (5th Cir. La. 1987) 
involved a lawsuit by a ship owner alleging tort theories against the vessel builderlseller and the 
designer of a component part of the vessels for damage to the vessels themselves. Relying 
heavily on the United States Supreme Court decision in East River Steamship Corp. v. 
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Transamevica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,90 L. Ed. 2d 865, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986), the Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that: 
Permitting a buyer to assert a tort claim against a subcontractor or 
component supplier may also implicate the seller; the supplier or subcontractor 
who is sued in tort can be expected to assert indemnity or contribution claims 
against the seller which assembled the product and incorporated the supplier's 
coinponent or work in the finished product. The effect of such a claim, if 
successful, would visit ultimate tort liability for defects in the vessel on the 
manufacturer and seller and would nullify the objective of East Rivev to limit the 
seller's liability in this type case to that assumed by contract. 
Several cases decided by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits under Minnesota 
and California law support the view that the product in this context means the 
finished product bargained for by the buyer rather than components furnished by a 
supplier. [citations omitted] 
Shipco, 825 F.2d 925,930 
The same result should apply in this case. For purposes of determining whether the 
economic loss rule applies to bar Taco Time's claims against Leishrnan Electric, the finished 
product bargained for by Taco Time was the remodeled restauranthuilding, not the installed 
neon sign and transformer. Taco Time has not identified any property which was not part of the 
"building, its contents, and the profits derived from the building's use that were damaged by the 
fire." R. Vol. 11, p. 304 All of the damages claimed by Taco Time are economic loss resulting 
6-om the subject of the transaction and are barred by the economic loss rule. 
E. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY 
Taco Time contends that because Leishman Electric was a licensed electrical contractor, 
the "special relationship" exception should apply to take this case out of the operation of the 
economic loss rule. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 30 This argument is raised for the first time 
on appeal and should not be considered. Rarnevth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197,983 P.2d 848 
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(Idaho 1999) (exceptions to the economic loss rule which were not asserted nor decided by the 
district court will not be considered for the first time on appeal) R. Vol. 11, pp. 285 - 287 
In the event this Court does consider the application of this exception, Taco Time's 
argument should he rejected because there was no "special relationship" between Taco Time and 
Leishman Electric. Taco Time had no direct contract with Leishman Electric. Leishman Electric 
was a subcontractor to the general contractor with which Taco Time contracted. Taco Time did 
not purchase the neon signs and transformers &om Leishman Electric. Taco Time did not 
contract with Leishman Electric to repair or install the neon signs and transformers. The 
evidence that Taco Time had a special relationship with Leishman Electric or relied on Leishman 
Electric for any critical work or inspections related to the neon signs is not present in this case. 
In fact, Brian Larsen, one of the owners of Taco Time testified as follows in his deposition: 
26 
22 Q. I just want to make sure that this is in the 
23 record. You know for a fact that Leishman Electric had 
24 nothing to do with repairing the neon signs; correct? 
25 A. Correct. 
27 
I Q. You never talked to Leishman Electric about 
2 installing the neon signs? 
3 A. Specifically installing the neon signs? 
4 Q. Yes. 
5 A. I did not have that conversation. 
6 Q. Did you ever talk to anybody at Leishman 
7 Electric and request that they inspect or evaluate the 
8 neon signs or the work of Sign Pro? 
9 A. I did not ask them to inspect the work of Sign 
10 Pro. 
1 1 Q. Did you ever ask Leishman Electric to inspect 
12 the transformers that were in those boxes? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Did you ever ask Leishman Electric whether 
15 Sign Pro was qualified to do the work that you had hired 
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16 them to do? 
17 A. No. 
Brian Larsen deposition, pp. 26, L 22 - 27 L 17 (attached to Leishrnan Electric's Motion to 
Augment) 
Because there was no personal relationship between Taco Time and Leishman Electric 
the "special relationship" described in McAlvain v. General Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 97 Idaho 777, 
554 P.2d 955 (1976) is not applicable to the facts of this case. The "special relationship" 
described in Dufin v. Idaho Crop ImprovementAssfn, 126 Idaho 1002, 1008, 895 P.2d 1195 
(Idaho 1995) is also inapplicable. Duffin found a "special relationship" with the Idaho Crop 
Improvement Association (ICIA) but not with the Federal-State Inspection Service (FSIS). The 
"special relationship" with ICIA was based on the fact that it had engaged in a marketing 
campaign, for the benefit of its members, the very purpose of which was to induce reliance by 
purchasers on the fact that potato seed had been certified. In contrast, no "special relationship" 
was found to exist with the FSIS because there was no theory from which it could be concluded 
that FSIS had actively sought to induce reliance on the part of purchasers of certified seed. The 
seed was inspected by the FSIS and found to be within tolerances for the absence of disease and 
FSIS inspectors placed tags on the trucks delivering the seed which designated that seed as 
"certified." However, that was not enough to create a "special relationship" with the FSIS. 
Applied to the facts of this case, Leishman Electric did not actively seek to induce 
reliance on the part of Taco Time. The fact the Leishman Electric was a licensed electrical 
contractor and performed electrical work as part of its subcontract is not sufficient to create a 
"special relationship" in this case. 
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702,711,99 P.3d 1092 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2004), where there was no direct relationship between the licensed engineer and the homeowner, 
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is also instructive: 
With respect to Wicher, at no time did the Nelsons or Steinbruegge have 
any contact with Wicher. Wicher, a licensed engineer, was hired by IBP to review 
the Nelson's cabin plans. There was no relationship at all between Wicher and the 
Nelsons. Thus, there is no special relationship between Wicher and the Nelsons 
similar to that found in DufJin. With consideration of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
holding in Dufin that a special relationship only applies to an extremely limited 
group of cases, we decline the invitation to expand that principle to the facts of 
this case. 
In the words of the Idaho Supreme Court there are an "extremely limited group of cases" 
where the "special relationship" exception will apply. Dufin, 126 Idaho 1002 at 1008 There are 
no facts in this case which would establish a "special relationship" between Taco Time and 
Leishman Electric. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FIRST DECISION IN WHICH IT "PARSED" 
DAMAGES BETWEEN WHAT WAS DIRECTLY SUBJECT TO THE 
REMODELING AND THE PARTS THAT WERE NOT IS SUPPORTED BY 
CASES R O M  OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Taco Time severely criticizes the trial court's original decision which found that the 
economic loss rule precluded Taco Time's negligence claims against Leishman Electric for 
damage to property which was the subject of the transaction. However, in a footnote the trial 
court salvaged a portion of the claim by stating: "This ruling does not dismiss all property 
damage claims asserted by Taco Time because some of the damage claims appear to be separate 
from the remodel project." R. Vol. I, p. 102 Taco Time claims this holding "evidences a lack of 
understanding of the rule's proper application." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 28 
Actually many courts, using the economic loss analysis, have denied recovery for 
I damages to the subject of the transaction and allowed recovery of damages to "other property." 
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This is well-summarized in Albers v. Deere & Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 11 64 (D.N.D. 2008) 
If the court is wrong about the header and the gasoline not being "other 
property" and tort recovery is permitted, Albers argues he is entitled to recover a11 
of his losses, including the loss of the combine. Essentially, his arpnent  is that 
the economic loss doctrine does not apply whatsoever once there is injury to 
persons or "other property." While there is some support for this argument, C & S 
Hamilton Hay, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13151,2008 WL 504031 at *4 (applying 
Idaho law); Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 1992 OK 155,845 P.2d 187,189,193 
(Okla. 1992), it appears most courts would apply the economic loss doctrine to 
limit tort recovery for damage to the product, even when there is personal injury 
or damage to "other property." E.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. 
American Eirrocopter, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3401 1,2005 WL 1610653, 
"16 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (applying North Carolina law); Corsica Cooperative 
Association, 967 F. Supp. at 387 (applying South Dakota law); Fleetwood 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 749 N.E.2d 492 (Ind. 2001). 
Because there is no Idaho decision which precisely addresses this issue, it is not clear that 
Judge Lodge's decision in C & S Hamilton Hay accurately applied Idaho law and it is certainly 
not binding precedent on this Court. However, it is presumptuous for Taco Time to suggest that 
the trial court lacked "understanding of the rule's proper application" where other courts have 
done exactly the same thing as the trial court did when applying the economic loss rule. 
It should be noted, however, that "incidental" property damage is not sufficient to avoid 
the bar of the economic loss rule. Miller v. United States Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573,576 (7th 
Cir. Wis. 1990) explained: 
Incidental property damage, however, will not take a commercial dispute 
outside the economic loss doctrine, Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of 
America, Inc., 782 F.2d 723,726-29 (7th Cir. 1986); the tail will not be allowed to 
wag the dog. 
While Leishman Electric fully supports the trial court's decision completely dismissing 
Taco Time's negligence claims by reason of the application of the economic loss rule, the 
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original order was not clearly erroneous in view of the above referenced authorities. If the order 
dismissing Leishnan Electric is reversed, this Court should not permit Taco Time to recover all 
of its damages. Those damages to property which was the subject of the transaction should still 
be barred. 
G. IF THE JUDGMENT DISMISSING TACO TIME'S COMPLAINT IS REVERSED 
AND TACO TIME IS ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAmT IT SHOULD 
NOT INCLUDE A CLAIM FOR PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST 
This issue need not be addressed unless the judgment dismissing Taco Time's claims 
against Leishman Electric is reversed. Leishman Electric agrees that "joint and several liability" 
with Sign Pro is not appropriate. However, that does not end the inquiry because two additional 
issues are implicated: (1) the proposed amended complaints seek recovery of 100% of Taco 
Time's damages which necessarily includes damages to the subject of the transaction and (2) the 
proposed amended complaints seek a recovery for pre-judgment interest. 
Leishman Electric submits that if the judgment is reversed, Taco Time should not be 
allowed to recover damage to the subject of the transaction. Because this issue is briefed and 
argued above, the authorities and arguments in support of this position are not restated here. For 
the reasons stated above, the damages sought in any amended complaint should not include 
damages to the subject of the transaction. 
The issue of pre-judgment interest was raised by Leishman Electric in opposition to Taco 
Time's Motion to Amend, hut the trial court did not reach the issue because it granted Leishman 
Electric's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although amendments are to be liberally granted, 
there is also a long-standing rule in Idaho that when considering whether to grant a motion for 
leave to amend, a trial court may consider whether the amended pleading sets out a valid claim. 
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Spuv Prods. Covp. 11. StoelRives LLP, 142 Idaho 41,44,122 P.3d 300 (Idaho 2005); See also 
Duffin v. Idaho Crop ImprovementAssfn, 126 Idaho 1002,1013,895 P.2d 1195 (Idaho 1995) 
(although leave to amend is to be freely given the decision to grant or refuse permission to amend 
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court); Black Canyon Racquetball Club v. Idaho First 
Nut? Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900 (Idaho 1991) (when determining whether an 
amended complaint should be allowed, the court may consider whether the new claims proposed 
to be inserted into the action by the amended conlplaint state a valid claim) 
The proposed amended complaints which have been filed with the trial court seek pre- 
judgment interest. R. Vol. 11, p. 279 at 7 24 and p. 296 at 'l/ 29 This is not an appropriate case 
for pre-judgment interest. Farm Dev. Covp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918,920,478 P.2d 298 
(Idaho 1970) (the amount upon which the interest is to be based must have been mathematically 
and definitely ascertainable to support a claim for pre-judgment interest); Bott v. Idaho State 
Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580,591,917 P.2d 737 (Idaho 1996) (the district court erred in awarding 
prejudgment interest since the damages were not finally ascertainable until the district court ruled 
on the ISBA'S motion for judgment n.0.v.); Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 17,43 
P.3d 768 (Idaho 2002) (even where Plaintiff clearly suffered some amount of damages prior lo 
the time they brought suit; the actual amount of damage was not ascertainable until the jury 
returned its verdict and Plaintiff was not entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest) 
Taco Time argued at one point in the proceedings that it was entitled to "pre-judgment 
interest" by reason of the decision in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 
28,33, 72 P.3d 868 (Idaho 2003) which relied on Yoz~ngv. Extension Ditch Co., 13 Idaho 174, 
182, 89 P. 296,298 (1 907). Mussell involved damages to a ditch while Young involved damage 
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to farm ground caused by the operators of a ditch. Both cases state that for damages to land the 
measure of damages is the actual cash value of the land or the cost of repair "with legal interest 
thereon." Mussell, 139 Idaho 28,33; Young, 13 Idaho 174, 182 A close reading of both 
decisions reveals that whether or not "pre-judgment interest" could be recovered in such cases 
was not the issue and it does not even appear that pre-judgment interest was calculated or 
awarded in either case. 
The present case does not involve damage to land and the decisions in Mussell and Young 
offer no rationale or logic why pre-judgment interest should be awarded in a case such as the one 
presented here. In McGuire v. Post Falls Lumber & Mfg. Co., 23 Idaho 608,614, 131 P. 654 
(Idaho 1913), the Idaho Supreme Court established the measure of damages for property and 
fixtures nearly 100 years ago: 
Where the property is totally destroyed or so badly injured and impaired as 
to render it valueless for the use to which it was origindly designed and 
appropriated, the measure of damages should be the value of the property at the 
time of its destruction. Where, however, the property is merely damaged and is 
capable of being repaired, the measure of damage should be the cost of repair 
together with the value of the use of the property during the time that it would 
take to repair it. 
Cf. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. City ofIdaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1 ,  10,407 P.2d 695,699 
(1965) (in civil action, the measure of damages for property or merchandise which is totally 
destroyed is the value of the property at the time and place of its destruction); Latham Motors, 
Inc., v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 689,696,851 P.2d 985,992 (Ct. App. 1992) (in civil action, measure 
of damages for the total loss of a car is the fair market value of the car at the time of its loss); also 
see IDJI 9.07: 
If the jury decides that the plaintiff is entitled to recover  om the defendant, the 
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jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 
compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the 
defendant's negligence. 
The elements of damage to plaintiffs property are: 
[eithed 
1. The reasonable cost of necessaty repairs to the damaged 
property, plus the difference between its fair market value before it was 
damaged and its fair market value after repairs. 
[or1 
1. The difference between the fair market value of the property 
immediately before the occurrence, and its [salvage value] [fair market 
value without repairs] after the occurrence. 
The Idaho Jury Instructions define "fair market value" for property as follows in WJI 9.12: 
When I use the term "value" or the phrase "fair market value" or 
"actual cash value" in these instructions as to any item of property, I 
mean the amount of money that a willing buyer would pay and a 
willing seller would accept for the item in question in an open 
marketplace, in the item's condition as it existed immediately prior 
to the occurrence in question. 
Nowhere in the history of Idaho jurisprudence is it suggested that in a case like this involving 
fire damage to a building and its contents is a plaintiff entitled to pre-judgment interest. More 
importantly, there is no suggestion in the cases involving damage to buildings and its contents, that 
such awards are exempt from the well-established rule that a grant of pre-judgment interest requires 
a showing that the damages were liquidated, even in cases where pre-judgment interest is allowed 
by an agreement in a contract or by statute. Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 
756,762,992 P.2d 75 1 (Idaho 1999) The Idaho Supreme Court held in Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. 
Co., 137 Idaho 9, 17, 43 P.3d 768 (Idaho 2002): 
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The title insurance policy did not specify a liquidated amount or amechanism 
for mathematically determining the amount of damages the Boels would suffer as the 
result of any particular title defect. Contrary to Stewart Title's argument, the Boels 
clearly suffered some amount of damages prior to the time they brought suit; 
however, the actual amount of damage was not ascertainable until the jury returned 
its verdict. Consequently, the district court's decision to deny the Boels' claim for pre- 
judgment interest is affirmed. 
In this case the amount of the damages is disputed and the share attributable to Leishman 
Electric, if any, is disputed. The actual amount of damage is not ascertainable until a verdict is 
returned in this case. Therefore, pre-judgment interest is not appropriate and if Taco Time is 
permitted to file an amended complaint, it should not be permitted to include a claim seeking pre- 
judgment interest because such a claim does not state a valid claim for relief under the circumstances 
of this case. 
H. TACO TIME IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Leishman Electric did not seek attorney fees below and does not seek attorney fees on appeal. 
Application of the "economic loss" rule is difficult and it is no surprise that the parties to this appeal 
see the issues differently. ''When there are fairly debatablequestions, attorney fees arenot awardable 
pursuant to LC. $ 12-121." Sunnyside Indus. & Proj'l Park, LLC v. Eastern Idaho Pub. Health 
Dist., 2009 Ida. App. LEXS 33 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 28,2009) Regardless of the outcome of this 
appeal, Leishman Electric does not believe that it has defended this appeal frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation. The trial court twice ruled in favor of Leishman Electric's arguments on the 
"economic loss" rule and Leishman Electric has submitted substantial authorities and facts which 
support the trial court's decisions. Leishman Electric requests that Taco Time's request for attorney 
fees on appeal be denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
Leishman Electric subcontracted to rewire the Taco Time restaurant as a part of remodeling 
project in 1998 and 1999. The transaction was the remodeling project and the subject of the 
transaction was the remodeled restaurant and building. That is what Taco Time purchased. It was 
an integrated whole and all of the damages which Taco Time sought to recover against Leishman 
Electric as a result of the 2004 fire were damages to the subject of the transaction. The court below 
was correct when it dismissed Taco Time's claims against Leishman Electric because the damage 
claims are barred by the economic loss rule. Leishman Electric requests this Court to affirm the 
wurt below. 
If the judgment dismissing Leishman Electric is reversed and this matter remanded for further 
proceedings, Leishman Electric requests this Court to hold that if damages to "other property" are 
found all damages to the subject of the transaction are barred by the economic loss rule. Leishman 
Electric further requests this Court to hold that Taco Time is not entitled to recover pre-judgment 
interest in this case. 
DATED this q? day of August, 2009 
By: 
'~t torney fdr Leishman Electric 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifl that on the 2$ day of ~ugus t ,  2009,I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
/ 
John Goodell & Brent Whiting [J] US. mail 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Chtd [ ] Express mail 
P. 0. Box 1391 [ ] Hand delivery 
Pocatello, ILl 83204-1391 [ ] Fax: 232-6109 
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J.R. SIMPLOT CO., a Nevada ) 
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) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ANDORDER 
HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION, a j 
Delaware corporation, et al, ) 
) 
Defendants. 1 
The Court has before it Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs tort 
claims. Oral argument was held on March 3. 1999, at the conclusion of which the Court 
granted the motion. This Memorandum Decision is intended to supplemenf and explain the 
Court's oral  ling. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff J.R Simplot Company ("Simplot") operates the Smokey Canyon Mine in 
Caribou County, Idaho Defendant Harnischfeger Corporal~on f"HarnischfegerV) 
manufactures surface-mining equipment. In 1987 Sunplot purchased a Serles 1200B hydraulic 
tninimg shovel ("the 1200B") from Harnischfeger for use at the Smokey Canyon Mine. 
Some 10 years later, on April 3, 1997, the 1200B caught fire and was severely 
damaged or destroyed. Its operator, Tommy Cynova, was not injured, and there was no 
damage to any properly except the 1200B itself. For purposes of thls hearing, the Court 
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assumes that the fire was interne and spread rapidly, such that it was simply a matter of luck 
that Cynova escaped uninjured. 
In addition to breach-of-contract claims, Simplol brings negligence and strict liability 
claims against Harnischfeger seeking to recover for the damage lo the 1200B. Harnischfeger 
has moved for summary judgment on all of Simplot's claims. The parties announced at oral 
argument, however, that they had reached a stipulation to dismiss the breach-of-contract 
claims. Finally, several other motions are pending, all of which involve Harnischfeger's 
recent discovery of significant evidence regarding the fire-preventive features of the 1200B. 
SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving the absence of any 
genuine issue of material fact that would allow a judgment as a maner of law. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,256 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, see id. at 255, and the Court must not make credibility 
determinations. See id. The Court must determine whether the evidence presented is such that 
a jury applying the proper evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or 
the defendant. See id. 
Once the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the 
burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict 
in her favor. See id. at 256-57. In meeting this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond 
the pleadings and show "by her affidavits, or by the deposilions, answers to interrogatories, or 
admissions on file* that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celocex Cop. v. Catren, 477 
U.S. 317. 324 (1986). 
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TORT CLAIMS 
In Clark v. Internmional Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978), the Idaho 
Supreme Court established the "economic-loss rule," which prevents a purchaser of a product 
from recovering in tor1 against the product's manufacnuer when the purchaser has sustained 
purely economic losses. "Economic losses" include the "cosu of repair and replacement of 
defective property which is the subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for 
inadequate value and consequent loss of profits or use." E.g., Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007, 895 P.2d 1195. I200 (1995) (citation and intern1 
quotation omitted). The rationale for the economic-loss rule is that provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code "adequately define the rights of the parties" where purely economic losses 
are at issue, and expanding tort law to address such losses "would only add more confusion in 
an area already played with overlapping and conflicting theories of recovery." Clark, 99 
Idaho at 336,581 P.2d at 794. 
Because Simplot does not allege that the fire caused any personal injury or damage to 
property other than the 1200B itself, application of the economic-loss rule would bar Siplot 's  
tort claims for damage to the 1200B. The rule, however, has three established exceptions: (1) 
where economic loss is parasitic to personal injury or property damage; (2) where unique 
circumstances require a different allocation of the risk; and (3) where the parties have a 
"special relationship" such that the manufaclurer should have a duty to avoid economic loss to 
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the purchaser. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1007-08, 895 P.2d at 1200-01. Simplot urges the creation 
of a new exception for economic losses arising from a sudden or calamitous event.' 
The parties agree that whether Simplot's economic losses are recoverable in tort is a 
question of Idaho law. The Court is mindful that, when interpreting Idaho law, it is bound by 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court. See Arizona EI@c. Power Coop., Inc. v. Berkeley, 59 
F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1995). In the absence of a controlling decision, this Court must 
predict how the Idaho Supreme Court would decide the question, "using intermediate appellate 
court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as 
guidance." Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). Because the Idaho Supreme Court has 
never addressed whether a "sudden or calamitous event" exception to the economic-loss rule 
should be created, the Court must refer to such sources to predict how the Idaho Supreme 
Court would resolve this question. 
The Court first examines the Dugfin decision itself. The Duf/sn court listed the three 
exceptions to the ecouomic-loss rule enumerated above using language suggesting that no 
undiscovered exceptions exist. The decision does not employ a broad phrase like "the 
exceptions to the rule include" before listing those three exceptions. Instead, it notes that the 
rule has exceptions, states the "first" exception, states another exception, and "finally" states 
the third exception. Duf/sn, 126 Idaho at 1007-08, 895 P.2d at 1200-01. This manner of 
'To the extent S i p l o t  argues that sudden and calamitous events, by their nature, fall 
within one or more of these exceptions, the Court concludes that the Idaho Supreme Court 
would not so hold. The Court reaches this conclusion for essentially for the same reasons it 
will later conclude that the Idaho Supreme Court would not create a new exception for such 
events. 
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listillg the exceptions to the economic-loss rule suggests that the list was intended to be 
exhaustive. 
Simplot argues that a decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals implicitly recognizes the 
"sudden and calamilous event" exception. That decision, Myers rr A. 0. Smith Harvestore 
Prods., Inc., 114 Idaho 432,436, 757 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988). contains the following 
statement, made in the context of deciding to apply the economic-loss rnle to bar a tort claim 
for damage to a product that malfunctioned in a less spectacular way than the 1200B is alleged 
to have done: "[Tlhese injuries did not result from a calamitous event or dangerous failure of 
the product. Rather, they arose from the failure of the product to match the buyers' 
commercial expectations." While this statement suggests that the ldaho Court of Appeals 
might have been receptive to creating the exception Simplot advocates, it is difftcult for the 
Court to assign it significant weight. The statement is, at best, pure dictum. More precisely, 
it is nothing more than an off-handed observation by the Court of Appeals about the facts 
presented in that case. As such, it provides no guidance as to how receptive the ldaho 
Supreme Court would be to the "sudden and calamitous event" exception urged by Simplot 
under the facts of this case. 
Simplot does, however, point to several jurisdictions that have created an exception 
to the economic-loss mle for losses stemming from sudden or calamitous events. See Cloud v. 
Kin, 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Gene CantreIl Drilling Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 571 F .  
Supp. 1216 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (applying Missouri law); Toucher Valley Grain Gravers, Inc. v. 
Op & Seibold Gen. Consfr., Inc., 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1992); Mac's Eggs, Inc. v. Rite-Way 
Agri Disfribs., 656 F. Supp. 722,730 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (applying Indiana law); Salt River 
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Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 
1984); Naional Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1983); Russell v. 
Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383 (Or. 1978). These courts distinguish between "the 
disappointed users ... and the endangered ones." Russell, 575 P.2d at 1387. In other words, 
they tend to view harm caused by a calamitous event as properly within the realm of tort law, 
regardless of the existence of a contractual relationship between the product's manufacturer 
and the person it harms. 
These court represent the minority view. Interestingly enough, the United States 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to air its views on this very issue in East River S.S. C o p .  
v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (applying admiralty law), in which the 
Court unanimously rejected the "sudden and calamitous event" exception. Citing "the need to 
keep products liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic 
limitation on damages," the Court pronounced the minority view "unsatisfactory" and "too 
indeterminate." Id. at 870-71. It held that "[elven when the harm to the product itself occurs 
through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, 
and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of his bargain-- 
traditionally the core concern of contract law." Id. at 870. Adopting the reasoning of Seely v. 
. , ' White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (1965). the progenitor of the majority approach, the Court 
elaborated: 
"The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical 
injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not 
rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury 
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The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the 
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products." 
Seely v. Whire Motor Co., 63 Cal. Zd, at 18, 403 P.2d, at 151. When a product 
injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for 
leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong. 
Id. at 871. 
It is difficult to regard a unanimous pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court 
on the precise issue at hand as anything less than extremely persuasive. Easf River was 
decided not by a fractured Court that was unemphatic in its holding, hul by one that thoroughly 
reviewed the case law and policy rationales on both sides and then, with one voice, 
wholeheartedly rejected the "sudden and calamitous event" exceplion. Although East River 
has no binding effect on the Idaho Supreme Court, it strikes this Court as highly influential, 
both because of the justices' unanimity and because of the quality of their reasoning. 
Finally, the Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes the economic-loss rule and 
contains no "sudden and calamitous event" exception: 
A...difficult question is presented when the defect in the product renders it 
unreasonably dangerous, hut the product d~es.notc.au.se harm to persons or 
property. In these situations the danger either (I) never eventuates in harm 
because the product defect is discovered before it causes harm, or (2) eventuates 
in harm to the product itself but not in harm to persons or other property. A 
plausible argument can be made that products that are dangerous, rather than 
merely ineffectual, should be governed by the rules governing products liability 
Memorandum Decision and Order - page 7 
law. However, a majority of courts have concluded that the remedies provided 
under the Uniform Commercial Code--repair and replacement costs and, in 
appropriate circumstances, consequential economic loss--are sufficient. Thus, 
the rules of this Restatement do not apply in such situations. 
Restatement (Third) of Torts 8 21 cmt. d (1997). 
Thus, the persuasiveness of East River, the fact that Emf River represents the majority 
rule of American jurisdictions, the position taken by the Restaiement (Third) of Torts, and the 
Idaho Supreme Court's longslanding adherence to the economic-loss rule and its previous 
delimitation of the rule's nanow exceptions all combine to strongly suggest that the Idaho 
Supreme Court would refuse to adopt a "sudden and calamitous event" exception to the 
economic-loss rule. For this reason, Simplot has failed to create a genuine issue of material 
fact that its claims are not barred by the economic-loss rule. Harnischfeger's motion for 
summary judgment on those claims is granted. 
CONTRACT CLAIMS 
On January 29, 1999, Hamischfeger moved for summary judgment on the contract 
claims stated in Count IV of Simplot's complaint. A few weeks later, on February 22. 1999, 
Simplot filed a notice of its intent to seek voluntary dismissal of the contract claims. At oral 
argument, the parties announced that they had reached a stipulation to dismiss Simplot's 
contract claims, which they would soon be filing. The stipulation will provide for dismissal of 
those claims with prejudice, with each party reserving its right to seek attorney fees, costs, and 
sanctions as allowed hy ~ l e .  
Memorandum Decision and Order - page 8 
The Court now grants the soon-to-be-filed stipulation. Simplot's contract claims are 
dismissed with prejudice, and either party may seek attorney fees, costs, and sanctions upon 
further application to the Court. 
Having decided to grant summary judgment, the Court finds moot the remaining 
motions, all of which involve Hamischfeger's newly changed position on a factual matter 
irrelevant to the summary-judgment decision. Finally, because no claims remain for trial, this 
case is closed. 
ORDER 
In accordance with the vicws expressed above, 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment--contract claims 
(Docket No. 42) is MOOT in accordance with a soon-to-be-filed stipulation of the parties. 
Plaintiffs contract claims are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to that stipulation, without 
prejudice to the rights of either party to seek an award of attorney fees, costs, and sanctions, if 
applicable, and upon further application to the Court in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment--tort 
claims (Docket No. 33) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs tort claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED tbat the remaining motions (Docket Nos. 31 and 38, parts 
1.2, 3, and 4) are MOOT. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. 
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